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Quasi Exclusive Dealing 
 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
 
A firm's discounting policies over a single product raise exclusive dealing concerns 
in two situations.  Literally, the practices are not exclusive dealing because they do not 
involve a condition that the purchaser not deal in the goods of a rival, although they may 
create a pricing incentive for it not to do so. 
 
 First, the firm may condition a discount on an exclusive deal. Second, the firm 
may offer quantity discounts of such a nature that their effect is to induce customers to 
take all their requirements for a given product from the defendant.1 In addition, a firm 
may employ “slotting” fees or similar allowances paid by manufacturers to retailers, with 
the possible result that rivals have difficulty obtaining access to shelf space.  In general, 
challenges to above cost discounting, where the engine of exclusion is price, must meet 
more severe structural requirements than exclusive dealing.  Indeed, predatory pricing 
is a “monopolization” offense requiring significant market shares in at least the 60-70% 
range, and it would be perverse to assess stricter structural requirements in cases 
involving below cost pricing than in those challenging prices that are above cost. 
Exclusionary Discounting and Rebate Practices 
Discounts Conditioned on Exclusivity 
 
A discount conditioned on exclusivity should generally be treated as no different 
from an orthodox exclusive-dealing arrangement. Section 3 of the Clayton Act expressly 
makes it unlawful to offer a “discount…or rebate…on the condition, agreement, or 
understanding that the…purchaser…shall not use or deal in the goods…of a 
competitor” where the required threat to competition occurs.
2
 Further, as the Supreme 
Court made clear in Tampa Electric, §3 of the Clayton Act condemns not merely 
express exclusive-dealing contracts but also contracts that have the “practical effect” of 
inducing exclusive dealing.
3
 Thus, antitrust policy should not differentiate between the 
manufacturer of widgets that explicitly imposes exclusive dealing on its dealers and the 
manufacturer that gives such dealers a discount or rebate for dealing exclusively in the 
manufacturer's widgets.
4
 
                                                 
*
 Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa 
1
The word “defendant” describes the firm or person whose conduct is in question, even though it is 
purely hypothetical or has never been sued. 
2
See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14. 
3
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 326 (1961); see 11 ANTITRUST ¶ 1801i. 
4
See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 62 F.T.C. 679, 714 (1963), rev'd, 339 F.2d 45, 47 (8th Cir. 1964), 
rev'd, 384 U.S. 316, 319 (1966) (shoe dealers agreeing not to deal in shoes of rivals received discounts); 
U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 596 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1993) (higher compensation 
for physicians agreeing to work exclusively for defendant's health maintenance organization, while 
compensation set at lower levels for physicians not so agreeing); Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793126
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To be sure, the fact that the inducement to agree to exclusive dealing is a price 
discount may not be completely irrelevant. For example, in explaining why a buyer has 
agreed to exclusive dealing the discount policy may render alternative efficiency 
explanations less likely—for example, that the buyer wanted an ensured source of 
supply that exclusive dealing tended to provide. In that case the seller would not need to 
offer a discount to induce the buyer to accept exclusive dealing. 
Discounts conditioned on exclusivity in relatively short-term contracts are rarely 
problematic. In general, short-duration contracts are not troublesome to antitrust policy,
5 
provided that other switching costs are not onerous.
1
  Perhaps a dominant firm's 
ongoing policy of offering discounts in exchange for exclusivity gives buyers incentives 
to stay with the same firm. But any above-cost discount can be matched by an equally 
efficient firm. For that reason short-term discounts should generally be regarded as no 
more anticompetitive than short-term absolute exclusive-dealing contracts. 
Discount contracts may contain troublesome “all or none” provisions. For example, 
the Microsoft consent decree restrained that firm from offering discounts to 
manufacturers of IBM-compatible computers on the condition that the manufacturers 
pay the license fee for every computer that it manufactured, whether or not that 
computer actually contained an operating system licensed by Microsoft.
6
 The impact of 
                                                                                                                                                             
125 F. 454 (8th Cir. 1903) (pre-Clayton; approving arrangement under which defendant gave rebates to 
dealers not carrying competing brands); see also Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 
F.2d 1253, 1257–58 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 890 (1988) (incentives insufficient; here, dominant 
spark plug maker did not insist on exclusive dealing but offered dealers gifts such as jackets and 
refrigerators for dropping competing lines); Woman's Clinic, Inc. v. St. John's Health Sys., Inc., 2003-2 
Trade Cas. ¶74,074 (W.D. Mo. 2002) (agreement between health care network and third-party payors 
under which patients paid more money if they sought care outside the network but were permitted to use 
non-network facilities was not exclusive dealing); Beverage Mgmt., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 653 
F. Supp. 1144, 1146, 1154 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (incentive program encouraging exclusivity in advertising 
supplier's brand not unlawful exclusive dealing, for retailer was free to sell competing brands; maximum 
incentive required only that retailer issue stipulated minimum number of ads per year that advertised only 
defendant's soft drink brand). Cf. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. Philip Morris, Incorporation, 60 F. 
Supp. 2d 502 (M.D.N.C. 1999), which initially granted a preliminary injunction against a dominant 
cigarette manufacturer's program that gave dealers significant discounts for using a display format that 
discriminated heavily in favor of the defendant's brands while making rivals' brands less visible; practical 
effect was to give Philip Morris brands 75 percent of the above-counter display space and in-store 
signage. The court did not explicitly analogize this to either tying or exclusive dealing but simply as a 
vertical restraint of trade. However, the court later gave the defendant summary judgment, finding 
inadequate proof of both market power and foreclosure. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 
199 F. Supp. 2d 362 (M.D.N.C. 2002), aff'd per curiam, 67 Fed. Appx. 810, 2003 WL 21456688 (4th Cir. 
June 24, 2003). 
5
See 11 ANTITRUST ¶ 1802g. 
1
 On this point, see id. at ¶ 1802g3. 
6
See Microsoft, consent decree, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,845 (Aug. 19, 1994), eventually approved by 56 F.3d 
1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). See also Richard M. Steuer, Discounts and Exclusive Dealing, 7 ANTITRUST 28 
(Spring 1993), who notes that Microsoft's discounts for exclusivity ran as high as 60 percent. Similarly, 
the Microsoft “per processor” license arrangement, under which computer manufacturers paid Microsoft a 
fee for each computer assembled, whether or not it incorporated any Microsoft software, operated as a 
kind of reverse discount; that is, while it did not reduce the cost to a computer manufacturer who agreed 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793126
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this policy was to give computer makers the incentive, first, to agree to the fee structure 
in order to get the lower price; and second, to install Microsoft operating systems on all 
their computers once the agreement was in place. With the agreement in force, the 
incremental cost of installing the Microsoft operating system on a particular computer 
was zero, since the fee had to be paid whether or not that computer contained a 
Microsoft system. By contrast, using a license from any other firm would have cost the 
computer maker the price of that license, thus making its investment in computers with 
non-Microsoft operating systems greater than in those with Microsoft systems. 
Such a scheme is problematic only when the defendant is a dominant firm in a 
position to force manufacturers to make an all-or-nothing choice. For example, suppose 
that Microsoft has a 90 percent share of IBM-compatible operating systems, and 
compatibility concerns led some 90 percent of customers to prefer a Microsoft operating 
system. At the same time, however, the remaining 10 percent of customers have unique 
needs or tastes and would prefer a non-Microsoft system such as IBM's OS-2 system. 
In such circumstances the computer manufacturer would be best off by serving the mix 
of customers that come to its door, perhaps selling 90 percent of its computers with a 
Microsoft system installed and the remaining 10 percent with the systems of rivals. In 
that case the discount policy effectively puts the manufacturer to the choice of either 
installing the Microsoft system on 100 percent of its computers or on none at all. Since 
the hardware maker cannot afford the second alternative, given Microsoft's dominance, 
it selects the first. The Government's Guidelines on Intellectual Property Licensing 
address this situation. They note that a “license that does not explicitly require exclusive 
dealing may have the effect of exclusive dealing if it is structured to increase 
significantly a licensee's cost when it uses competing technologies.”
7
 
In its 1922 United Shoe Machinery decision the Supreme Court condemned USM's 
policy of offering a discount on the leases of its shoe machines on the condition that the 
shoe manufacturer not use the machines of a competitor.
8
 As the Court explained, 
“[w]hile the clauses enjoined do not contain specific agreements not to use the 
machinery of a competitor of the lessor, the practical effect of these drastic provisions is 
to prevent such use.”
9
 Other courts have drawn similar conclusions about “penalty” 
                                                                                                                                                             
to use Microsoft products exclusively, it increased the costs of using a competitor's software because in 
that case the manufacturer would have to pay one license fee to Microsoft and a second fee to the 
competitor. See Microsoft, consent decree, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,845-02, 42,850 (Aug. 19, 1994) (“In effect, 
the royalty payment to Microsoft when no Microsoft product is being used acts as a penalty, or tax, on the 
OEM's use of a competing PC operating system.”). 
7
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 4.1.2 (1994); these 
Guidelines are reprinted as Appendix C in the Supplement. 
8
United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 455, 457 (1922). The clause at issue 
provided for a reduced royalty “for lessees who agree not to use certain machinery on shoes lasted on 
machines other than those leased from the lessor.” Id. at 457. 
9
Id. at 457. See also Carter Carburetor Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission, 112 F.2d 722 (8th 
Cir. 1940), finding that a dominant carburetor maker's discount for customers agreeing not to buy 
competitors' carburetors violated §3. The practice prevented small rivals from obtaining any foothold in 
the market, even if they had a superior product and a lower price. Id. at 733. The court found it irrelevant 
that customers were not required “to affirmatively promise in express terms” not to handle competing 
goods. “The condition against handling the goods of competitors was made as fully effective as though it 
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clauses that effectively require lessees or purchasers to pay a higher price if they use 
competing goods.
10
 
Quantity, Market Share, and Related Discounts and Rebates 
Somewhat different from discounts conditioned on exclusivity are discounting plans 
that simply give a customer a lower price for buying in larger absolute quantities or a 
larger proportion of its needs. Of course, only extreme quantity discount programs 
amount to de facto exclusive dealing, but the situation can occur.
11
 Suppose that the 
largest users of coal purchase one million tons per year, and that the defendant's 
discount program offers incremental and cumulative discounts in 100,000 ton 
increments all the way through and beyond the one million ton mark. In that case a 
buyer obtains the defendant's lowest price by purchasing all of its coal needs there. As 
a consequence that buyer purchases no coal from others. 
Quantity discounts are often challenged by smaller, disfavored customers under the 
“secondary line” provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act.
12
 Such cases are not 
concerned with the foreclosure injuries of rival sellers, however. Quantity discounts 
could also constitute a form of predatory pricing, which is unlawful when structural and 
pricing conditions are met.
13
 But the quantity discount program to be challenged as 
unlawful exclusive dealing would necessarily have to be one that involves prices above 
cost, or else the program would not be sustainable.
14
 
                                                                                                                                                             
had been written in and affirmatively agreed to in express terms in the contracts.” See also United States 
v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 83 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Ill. 1949) (defendant's discount on welding rods in 
exchange for customer's agreement not to buy rods from a rival violated §3; firm formerly had 100 
percent of market but market was apparently becoming more competitive and court viewed discounting 
practice as an effort to suppress growth of rivals); see also Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30, 47–
49 (1953). 
10
See Chiplets, Inc. v. June Dairy Prods. Co., 89 F. Supp. 814 (D.N.J. 1950), 114 F. Supp. 129 (D.N.J. 
1953) (condemning penalty clauses in leases of butter pat-making machines; penalty had to be paid when 
the lessee also used the machine of a rival. See 114 F. at 143. No discussion of defendant's market share.). 
11
One must distinguish contracts that simply provide a discount for a single large purchase. While an 
exclusive dealing contract “flatly eliminates the buyer from the market for its duration,” a “fixed 
quantity” contract leaves open the possibility “that the buyer's needs will exceed his contractual 
commitment; he is free to purchase from others any excess amount that he may want.” Barry Wright 
Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 237 (1st Cir. 1983) (single large purchase at a discount not 
“exclusive dealing”); accord Main St. Publishers, Inc. v. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 1289, 
1295 (N.D. Miss. 1988). 
12
See 14 ANTITRUST ¶ 2351c; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 14.6 (4th ed. 2011). 
13
See 3A Antitrust Law Ch. 7C-2 on the structural prerequisites to predatory pricing, and id., Ch. 7C-
3 on the pricing requirements. 
14
See Barr Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 978 F.2d 98, 105–07 (3d Cir. 1992) (discount program 
challenged as unlawful exclusive dealing did not involve prices below cost; as a result it was not 
predatory pricing); see also W. Parcel Serv. v. UPS of Am., Inc., 190 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(distinguishing volume discounts from exclusive dealing; former are “not exclusive dealings” and are 
“legal under antitrust law,” citing Fedway Associates. v. United States Treasury, 976 F.2d 1416, 1418 
(D.C. Cir. 1992)). Cf. Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001) 
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Most quantity discount programs are undoubtedly designed to reflect the reduced 
costs of larger transactions. As such, they are clearly competitive and antitrust should 
encourage them. But suppose that a discounting program is clearly in excess of 
anything justified by significant savings. For example, suppose that the program gives 
incremental discounts stretching up to very large volumes and permits the aggregation 
of all purchases over a lengthy period, say one year. In order to qualify for the maximum 
discount, the buyer will then make all its purchases from that seller during the one-year 
period; any division between two sellers would reduce the discount. 
One approach to such schemes is to treat them as exclusive dealing contracts, with 
the contract period equal to the period over which purchases can be aggregated for 
purposes of measuring the size of the discount. For example, suppose that a coal seller 
gives an additional 1 percent discount off the entire purchase price for each incremental 
1,000 tons of coal purchased—a 1 percent discount if the purchase totals 1,000 tons, a 
2 percent discount if the purchase totals 2,000 tons, and so on. Further, for purposes of 
computing the discount, the seller permits the purchaser to aggregate all purchases 
made within a calendar year. As a result, switching coal suppliers at any time within the 
year forces a retroactive decrease in the discount of coal that has been purchased to 
that point. 
Note first that this arrangement should generally have no greater anticompetitive 
effect than an outright exclusive dealing arrangement of one year's duration. If exclusive 
dealing under equivalent structural conditions and subject to equivalent defenses were 
lawful, the discount arrangement should be lawful as well. But the competitive impact 
must in fact be less because any equally efficient rival can take the customer by bidding 
a better price and even compensating the customer for the loss of the discount from the 
defendant—assuming, as we have, that the defendant's program results in above-cost 
prices at all discount levels. Further, if a rival cannot match the price even when it is 
above cost, that suggests that the quantity discount program is efficient in the sense 
that the larger-volume transaction imposes lower per-unit costs than a smaller 
transaction would. For these reasons we suggest that discounts attached merely to the 
quantity of goods purchased, and not to exclusivity itself, be treated as lawful, and not 
be subjected to the laws of exclusive dealing.
2 
The exception is when the discounted 
price is below cost, in which case it would be subject to the ordinary rules governing 
predatory pricing.
3
 
 Some decisions involve situations where the defendant aggregates the discount 
across two or more related products, while the plaintiff produces only one or a subset of 
these products.  These “bundled” discounts are often treated by the courts as unilateral 
                                                                                                                                                             
(nonpredatory incentive agreements with travel agents and tour packagers inducing them to use British 
Airways were not anticompetitive). 
2
 See Barr Labs, 978 F.2d at 110–11 (doubting whether “exclusive dealing” applied to an 
arrangement where pharmaceutical purchasers received a discount for purchasing a large quantity of 
defendant's products and also promised to sell its products where they were able to do so, although they 
also continued to sell the products of rivals). 
3
 See generally 3A Antitrust Law Ch. 7C. 
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exclusionary practices.
16
  However, they have also been treated as tying arrangements 
and subjected to somewhat different legal tests under §1 of the Sherman Act.
4
 In 
appropriate circumstances such multi-product discount programs can exclude an 
equally efficient rival that produces only one product, for the latter would need to give a 
much larger discount in order to compensate customers for the loss of discount on 
products that it did not sell. 
One important difference between discounts offerings and exclusive dealing relates 
to the relative ease with which rivals can make competing offers.  Traditional tying and 
exclusive dealing are typically long-term contractual arrangements. The buyer can 
purchase the good subject to the exclusive agreement only by breaching its contract or 
else by giving up something else in which it has made a significant investment. For 
example, a franchise tying or exclusive dealing agreement typically requires the 
franchisee or dealer to purchase the supplier's good exclusively. The buyer can 
purchase the good from rivals only by giving up its franchise or dealership, which may 
be far more valuable to the dealer than the value of any savings from an alternative 
purchase, particularly if the dealer has significant costs invested in its dealership.
S1
   
The result is that an equally efficient producer of the excluded product cannot steal the 
sale simply by offering a somewhat lower price. For example, the pizza franchisees in 
Queen City or the tooth product dealers in Dentsply could not profit by purchasing 
cheaper pizza dough or tooth-filling materials from a rival seller because any gains from 
                                                 
16
See 3A ANTITRUST ¶ 749 in the main text and Supplement. See Cascade Health Solutions v. 
PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008); LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 542 U.S. 953 (2004). SmithKline Corporation v. Eli Lilly and Company, 427 F. Supp. 1089 
(E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978), which condemned the 
defendant's discount program that aggregated three drugs, only one of which was produced by the 
plaintiff. The defendant produced drugs A, B and C. B and C were high-profit, high-volume drugs in 
which the defendant faced little competition. However, the defendant produced A in competition with the 
plaintiff's similar drug, A'. The defendant then launched a rebate program that gave hospitals and other 
large purchasers a 3 percent rebate above all others provided they purchased a stipulated minimum 
quantity of the aggregate of its three drugs. In order to obtain the rebate, many hospitals had to take the 
defendant's A, and because the rebate extended across high-volume B and C, the defendant promised a 
very large discount. In order to give an equivalent discount on its single drug A', the plaintiff would have 
to cut its price by as much as 35 percent. SmithKline, 575 F.2d at 1060–62. While the facts resembled 
tying, the court found that the “agreement” requirement had not been met, but it condemned the 
arrangement under §2 of the Sherman Act. See also Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Exclusionary Bundled Discounts and the Antitrust Modernization Commission, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 517 
(2008); Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Complex Bundled Discounts and Antitrust Policy, 57 
BUFF. L. REV. 1227 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1344536 
(concerning bundles with variable proportions and bundles containing more than two products). 
 
4
 On the tying arrangement test and comparison of the §1 and §2 approaches, see 10 ANTITRUST ¶ 
1758. 
S1
See, e.g., ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION AND CONTROL (1983); Paul L. Joskow, Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical 
Relationships: Empirical Evidence, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95 (1988); Ian MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment 
of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. 
U. L. REV. 854 (1978). 
Hovenkamp                                                                Quasi Exclusive Dealing                          September, 2011, Page 7 
lower prices would almost certainly not be enough to compensate them for the loss of 
their dealerships or franchises.
S2
  For these reasons issues of contract duration and 
“switching” costs are relevant in cases involving exclusive dealing.  They tell us 
something about the likelihood that rivals will be able to compete against the 
defendant’s arrangement. 
By contrast, the discount conditioned on exclusivity places the buyer in a much 
different position: when it purchases from a rival it loses the discount, but not its 
dealership or franchise. If Domino's merely offered its franchisees a 10 percent discount 
if they committed to purchasing all of their pizza dough from their franchisor, then any 
rival would have been able to steal the franchisees' trade simply by meeting or beating 
the discounted price. Because the franchise itself is not at risk, an equally efficient rival 
should be able to steal the sale as long as the fully discounted price is above cost.  As a 
result, the “duration” of a discount program is no longer than the time it takes for a rival 
to match the discount. 
This analysis applies to all situations in which the discount covers to a single 
product, or where the discount applies to multiple products but at least one significant 
rival makes the same set of products. In all such cases an equally efficient rival could 
steal the sale and – given that there is no exclusive dealing – the buyer would not suffer 
a penalty by accepting the rival’s offer other than the loss of the transaction with the 
dominant firm. The analysis necessarily also applies to quantity and “market share” 
discounts.
S3
 Further, a discount that requires the purchaser to take less than 100 
percent of its product from the seller excludes less than a discount conditioned on 
exclusivity. 
We therefore question the conclusion by the district court in Natchitoches that a 
discount practice foreclosing 32 to 39 percent of a market for medical disposal 
containers might have violated the Sherman Act, even though the fully discounted price 
was not shown to be below any measure of cost.
S4
 Not only were the discounts 
conceded to be above cost, but the plaintiff in this case was a hospital purchaser 
alleging a monopoly overcharge as damages. In that case equally efficient rivals 
accounting for more than 60 percent of the market could easily have obtained the sales 
                                                 
S2
Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 
1059 (1998) (refusing to condemn franchisor's requirement that franchisees purchase its own pizza dough 
exclusively); Howard Hess Dental Labs., Inc. v. Dentsply Intl., Inc., 424 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 547 U.S. 1173 (2006) (private action following on successful government action challenging 
traditional exclusive dealing in defendant's tooth material). 
S3
E.g., Concord Boat Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 979 
(2000) (refusing to condemn above-cost market share discounts because purchasers were free to walk 
away at any time and purchase from a rival). 
S4
Natchitoches Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. v. Tyco Intern., Ltd., No. 1:05-CV-12024-PBS, 2009 WL 
4061631 (D. Mass. Nov. 20, 2009).  The court also gave weight to claims that the defendant acted 
anticompetitively by monitoring the purchasing practices of hospitals for compliance; but it is unclear 
why ensuring that one is complying with a contract should be regarded as anticompetitive.  Finally, the 
market shares covered by these arrangements was found to be in the range of 32%-39%, which is too low 
for effective foreclosure, given that the arrangements were not exclusive dealing at all but rather market 
share discounts, and also were not predatory pricing. See ¶d. 
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simply by bidding a less monopolistic price.
S5
 
By contrast, in Allied Orthopedic the Ninth Circuit rejected claims challenging the 
defendant’s discount programs under both §§1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
S6
 The 
product in question was pulse oximetry devices, which collect information about a 
hospital patient’s heart and blood oxygen and transmits this information to a screen. 
Tyco pioneered technology that made it less costly for hospitals to upgrade and add 
additional features to their pulse oximetry systems. Tyco sold these devices to hospitals 
principally through group purchasing organizations (GPOs), and many of the sales were 
“sole source,” which means that Tyco’s product was the only one on the GPO 
contract.
S7
 The pricing was also subject to market share, or “loyalty,” discounts which 
gave purchasers a lower price if they agreed to purchase a specified minimum 
percentage of their pulse oximetry needs from Tyco. However, hospitals were not 
required to purchase exclusively from Tyco and, for that matter, were not required to 
purchase exclusively through the GPO contract at all. They were free to purchase 
elsewhere; although they could lose Tyco’s discount if they purchased more than a 
specified percentage elsewhere. Finally, even Tyco’s fully discounted prices were not 
alleged to be below cost; to the contrary, the plaintiffs were purchasers seeking 
damages for overcharges on the theory that the prices contained an element of 
monopoly markup. Tyco had at least two rivals, Masimo and GE. 
The district judge had found that these arrangements did not violate the antitrust 
laws because the contractual arrangement did not prohibit hospitals from purchasing 
from one of the competitors; they were free “at any time” to switch. In affirming the court 
found it “significant that the market-share discount and sole-source agreements in this 
case did not contractually obligate Tyco's customers to purchase anything from Tyco. 
Rather, the agreements provided only for substantial discounts to customers that 
actually purchased a high percentage of their sensor requirements from Tyco.”
S8
 In this 
particular case at least one of the rivals was selling generic sensors at a lower price 
than Tyco’s price and the expert “never explained why price-sensitive hospitals would 
adhere to Tyco’s market-share agreements when they could purchase less expensive 
generic sensors instead.”
S9
 The plaintiff’s expert: 
postulated that if a hospital chose to purchase a competitor's 
monitor, that hospital could lose Tyco's discounts on the sensors it 
continued to need for its installed base of Tyco monitors. 
                                                 
S5
Even if one believed that the Sherman Act should reach exclusion of less efficient rivals, in this case 
the court cited no evidence of scale economies, nor any evidence that rivals were in fact less efficient than 
the plaintiff. 
S6
Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., LP, 592 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2010). See 
also Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000) (approving market share 
discounts on boat motors sold to boat manufacturers). 
S7
Allied Orthopedic, 592 F.3d at 995 (“Under Tyco's sole-source agreements, a GPO agreed that it 
would not enter into a purchasing contract with any other vendor of pulse oximetry products, and Tyco in 
return offered a deeper discount. Like Tyco's market-share discount agreements, the sole-source 
agreements at issue here did not contractually obligate GPO members to purchase anything from Tyco.”). 
S8
Id. at 996. 
S9
Id. 
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Nonetheless, even such a hospital could simply begin to purchase 
less expensive generic sensors for its remaining Tyco monitors. We 
thus agree with the district court that on the facts of this case, 
something more than the discount itself is necessary to prove that 
Tyco's market-share discount agreements forced customers to 
purchase its sensors rather than generics.
S10
 
In sum, “any customer subject to one of Tyco’s market-share discount agreements 
could choose at any time to forego the discount offered by Tyco and purchase from a 
generic competitor,” and this fact substantially negated the foreclosure claim.
S11
 
The same reasoning largely applied to the “sole source” agreements with group 
purchasing organizations (GPOs). Under those arrangements the GPO placed only a 
single supplier’s product on a GPO contract for hospital purchase, but nothing required 
the hospital to purchase exclusively through that particular contract. Only one of the 
GPO contracts at issue forbade a hospital from being a member in any other GPO at 
the same time.
S12
 However, even this particular GPO’s arrangement did not prohibit the 
hospitals from purchasing from the vendors completely outside the GPO arrangement. 
The court also spoke briefly of its previous Masimo decision, which had condemned 
some market-share and sole-source arrangements under the Sherman Act.
S13
 In that 
case, however, the facts were that a particular Tyco patent was still in effect that 
effectively required customers to purchase Tyco sensors for their installed base of Tyco 
monitors. This fact had given Tyco additional tying-like leverage and served to justify the 
lower court’s conclusion of illegality. But the patent had since expired and the monitors 
and sensors were not technologically independent of one another.
S14
 
While loyalty discounts have seemed troublesome to some,
5
 most of them are 
undoubtedly beneficial, bringing lower output and higher prices.  Perhaps 
problematically, their greatest value lies in markets with high fixed costs, which of 
course are also markets that are structurally more conducive to market dominance.  The 
markets for such things as medical and computer devices, where such discounts 
frequently occur, are typically characterized by high fixed costs for innovation and 
production and frequently they also have relatively short production runs as a result of 
relatively quick obsolescence.  In that setting the price that a firm can bid is critically 
                                                 
S10
Id. at 997. 
S11
Id.  
S12
Allied Orthopedic, 592 F.3d at 997, speaking of the HealthTrust GPO. 
S13
Id. at 997 & n.2 (referring to Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., No. 07-55960, 350 Fed. 
Appx. 95, 2009 WL 3451725, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 23765 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2009)). 
S14
See 3A ANTITRUST ¶ 749e. 
5
 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, How Loyalty Discounts Can Perversely Discourage Discounting, 5 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 190 (2009); see also Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death 
of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 2009 (2009) (speaking mainly of bundled 
discounts); Willard K. Tom, David A. Balto & Neil W. Averitt, Anticompetitive Aspects of Market-Share 
Discounts and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67 ANTITRUST L.J.  615, 636–38 (2000). Contra 
Daniel A. Crane, Does Monopoly Broth Make Bad Soup?, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 663 (2010); Timothy J. 
Brennan, Bundled Rebates as Exclusion Rather than Predation, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 335 
(2008). 
Hovenkamp                                                                Quasi Exclusive Dealing                          September, 2011, Page 10 
sensitive to its expectations about output.  For example, if fixed development costs for a 
device are $1,000,000 and variable production costs are $100, the firm’s breakeven 
point is $1100 per unit if 1000 units are sold over the product’s life.  However, they fall 
to $200 if the firm sells 10,000 units, and to $110 if the firm sells 100,000 units.  The 
firm very likely cannot control for market wide swings in demand; however, it can 
maximize its output by inducing customer loyalty.  In this setting a market share 
discount effectively “shares” with the customer the costs of lower as opposed to higher 
output.  To the extent customers buy more they can expect prices to be lower, because 
costs will be lower too.
6
  To be sure, in concentrated markets this practice may force 
lower output and thus higher unit costs on rivals.  But even the monopolist should be 
able to reduce its own costs without concern about the impact on rivals.  Further, 
equally efficient rivals can attain similar efficiencies for themselves.  In some extreme 
cases the market may not have room for the high output of two or more rivals, but 
antitrust should not be brought to bear to protect smaller rivals by imposing inefficiently 
low rates of output at consumers’ expense.
7
 
Slotting Allowances and Related Purchases of Distribution Services 
Some discounts take the form of payments that producers pay up front to grocers or 
other retailers, effectively for access to the retailer's shelf space.
18
 For example, a 
                                                 
6
 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, ___ ANTITRUST L.J. ___ 
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1679849. 
7
 The FTC’s case against Intel Corp. ended in a consent decree limiting Intel’s right to use market 
share or related discounts. See In re Intel Corp. V.A. (FTC # 9341) (Aug. 4, 2010) (consent order), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/100804inteldo.pdf; see id. at IV.A.7. The provision 
permits Intel to offer a discount on those units sold in excess of a certain percentage, but not a discount on 
all purchases if total sales exceed a specified percentage.  For example, under the decree Intel may offer a 
3% discount on all purchases in excess of 100,000 units. However, it may not offer a 3% discount on all 
purchases, provided that the purchaser takes at least 100,000 units. This provision is intended to make it 
easier for a rival to match Intel’s prices on a unit by unit basis, rather than also requiring the rival to 
compensate Intel for loss of discount on foregone sales.  A later provision in the decree permits Intel to 
match any discount that it reasonably believes is being offered by a rival. Id. at IV.B.3. 
18
See F.T.C., REPORT ON THE FTC WORKSHOP ON SLOTTING ALLOWANCES AND OTHER MARKETING 
PRACTICES IN THE GROCERY INDUSTRY (2001), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/02/slottingallowancesreportfinal.pdf, which found no reason to condemn 
slotting allowances categorically, even when they were used by dominant firms, but recommended further 
study. See also Mary W. Sullivan, Slotting Allowances and the Market for New Products, 40 J.L. & 
ECON. 461 (1997), which finds them generally procompetitive for some of the reasons developed here.  
Accord Benjamin Klein & Joshua D. Wright, The Economics of Slotting Contracts, 50 J.L. & ECON. 473 
(2007); Joshua D. Wright, Slotting Contracts and Consumer Welfare, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 439, 440–42 
(2007). See also Paul N. Bloom, Gregory T. Gundlach & Joseph P. Cannon, Slotting Allowances and 
Fees: Schools of Thought and the Views of Practicing Managers, 64 J. MARKETING 92 (2000), which 
describes the literature and the views of market participants. See also Ronald W. Davis, A Mystery 
Wrapped in an Enigma: Slotting Allowances and Antitrust, 15 SPG ANTITRUST 69 (2001). 
Slotting allowances may also violate the Robinson-Patman Act when they create discounts that are 
not functionally available to all wholesale purchasers. As such, they are typically dealt with as a form of 
“indirect” price discrimination. See 14 ANTITRUST ¶ 2322b; see, e.g., Hygrade Milk & Cream Co. v. 
Tropicana Prods., Inc., 1996 WL 257581, 1996-1 Trade Cas. ¶ 71,438 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1996) (denying 
summary judgment). 
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grocer may wish to allocate scarce display space to only two of the three major brands 
of prepared baby food. While the grocer feels that it must carry Gerber, the major brand, 
smaller rivals Heinz and Beech-Nut are forced to compete with each other for the 
second spot by offering the retailer an “allowance”—payment for access to the grocer's 
shelf space.
19
 Most typically, the size of the allowance is “fixed”—that is, it does not vary 
with the number of units sold, although it may be proportioned to the amount of shelf 
space that the item in question requires. 
Slotting allowances are rarely anticompetitive except in the unusual case when they 
are paid by a dominant firm for complete or substantial exclusivity.
20
 In most cases the 
allowances are paid to retailers in order to induce them to carry and display a product 
whose prospects are uncertain to the retailer. This could be a new and untested 
product, but it could also be a product whose historical demand is flat or declining or 
that faces entry from new rivals or brands. In such cases the allowance signals that the 
manufacturer or distributor of the good in question has greater confidence about its 
sales prospects than the retailer has, perhaps because the retailer has less information 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Although much of that 
decision concerns the merits of slotting-like practices, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of 
standing.  See 2 ANTITRUST ¶ 348 in the Supplement. 
19
These were the facts of Federal Trade Commission v. H.J. Heinz Company, 246 F.3d 708, 712 
(D.C. Cir. 2001), which refused to approve a merger between the second and third firms in the market, in 
part because it would have eliminated the competition between them for the second spot. As the D.C. 
Circuit described the situation: 
At the wholesale level Heinz and Beech-Nut both make lump-sum payments 
called “fixed trade spending” (also known as “slotting fees” or “pay-to-stay” 
arrangements) to grocery stores to obtain shelf placement. Gerber, with its strong 
name recognition and brand loyalty, does not make such pay-to-stay payments. 
The other type of wholesale trade spending is “variable trade spending,” which 
typically consists of manufacturers' discounts and allowances to supermarkets to 
create retail price differentials that entice the consumer to purchase their product 
instead of a competitor's. 
Id. at 712. 
The district court incorrectly concluded that slotting fees should be disregarded because there was no 
evidence that they resulted in lower prices to consumers. See F.T.C. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 
190, 197–98 (D.D.C. 2000), rev’d, 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001). But the difficulty of tracing a discount 
hardly indicates an absence of competitive significance. Rather, the competition was for scarce shelf 
space, and a high slotting allowance was effectively the winner's willingness to assume a great amount of 
the risk of poor sales. (To the extent it is relevant, H.H. was consulted by one of the merging firms). 
20
In Conwood Company, L.P. v. United States Tobacco Company, 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 1148 (2003), the Sixth Circuit condemned the defendant's program of giving a .3 percent 
price discount to retailers in exchange for their “providing USTC [the defendant] with sales data, and 
participating in USTC promotion programs, and/or giving the best placement to USTC racks and POS,” 
even though the discounts were not conditioned on exclusivity at all. The court did not require any 
showing of anticompetitive effects or, for that matter, that the practice was even capable of excluding 
anyone. Now did it explain why rivals who themselves had extraordinarily high margins could not match 
a discount of less than {[fraction numer="1" denom="2" ]} percent. (To the extent it is relevant, H.H. was 
consulted by the defendant). 
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about the good's prospects. 
The special characteristic of the “fixed” slotting allowance that gives it this risk-
transferring property is that it is a discount that diminishes as the volume of goods sold 
increases. To illustrate, suppose a grocer is somewhat unsure about the resale 
prospects of Brand X, a new breakfast cereal. Many brands of cereal compete for 
limited grocer shelf space, and the grocer must have some means of selecting among 
them. Brand X offers the grocer $100 a month for 18 inches of shelf space, which is the 
amount necessary to display Brand X. If the grocer accepts this deal and sells 1,000 
boxes of Brand X monthly from this space, the discount amounts to only 10 cents per 
box. If it sells only 100 boxes monthly, however, the discount amounts to $1.00 per box; 
and if the cereal is a real flop, and sells only 10 boxes monthly, the discount comes out 
to a prohibitive $10.00 per box. By paying this allowance the manufacturer effectively 
assures the grocer that the manufacturer's product will be in the successful, high-
volume category. 
To be sure, one can imagine an extreme case in which an upstream monopolist 
uses slotting allowances or equivalent payments to purchase all, or at least most, of a 
grocer's shelf space, thus denying access to rivals. Such a case must be analyzed 
under exclusive-dealing principles, considering both possible benefits and potential 
anticompetitive effects.
21
 
 
Market Share and Foreclosure Requirements 
The discussion of exclusive dealing suggests that minimum market shares in the 
range of 30 to 40 percent are required for condemnation.
8
  These numbers presume 
outright exclusive dealing and contracts of sufficiently long duration.
9
  When the 
restraint in question excludes less and rivals are in a stronger position to bid business 
away from the defendant, then foreclosure percentages must accordingly be higher.  
Importantly, the exclusionary power of loyalty and related discounts is critically 
dependent on scale economies.  Further, foreclosure percentages in the lower range 
suggest that other rivals can more readily meet the defendant’s prices.  Overreaching is 
particularly likely if there are other firms who are nearly as large as the defendant and 
thus in a position to make similar discount offers.  As a result the structural 
                                                 
21  
See 11 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, Ch. 18 (3d ed. 2011).  Slotting allowances have been 
characterized as a barrier to entry to the extent they operate as an “entrance fee,” or “sunk” cost that must 
be paid by new firms entering the market. Willard K. Tom, David A. Balto & Neil W. Averitt, 
Anticompetitive Aspects of Market Share Discounts and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67 
ANTITRUST L.J. 615, 639 & n.36 (2002). But such fees are sunk only to the extent that any short-term 
rental fees are sunk. For example, a slotting allowance paid quarterly for shelf space access might 
resemble a three-month nonrefundable lease on a business van. If the business fails during that period, the 
unused portion of the lease will not be returned to the lessee. But costs that are sunk over such short-term 
time horizons are rarely significant entry barriers. For example, even the farmer who fertilizes his field in 
the spring will probably not be able to recover the cost of “unused” fertilizer in the case of a midsummer 
crop failure. 
8
See 11 ANTITRUST ¶ 1821c.  
9
 Id. at ¶ 1821d3. 
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requirements for “quasi” exclusive dealing practices that fall short of actual exclusive 
dealing, including market share and similar discounts where price is the engine of 
exclusion, should be the same as those for monopolization cases generally.  Indeed, if 
the discounted prices were below cost and challenged as predatory pricing,
10
 the 
structural requirements for monopolization would generally apply.  It would be quite 
perverse to require greater market dominance in the case of above cost discounts than 
the law currently applies to below cost pricing. 
 
 
                                                 
10
 See 3A Antitrust Law, Ch. 7C. 
